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THE HEROES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
Frederick Schauer* 
THE TRIALS OF LENNY BRUCE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN 
AMERICAN ICON. By Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover. 
Naperville: Sourcebooks, Inc. 2002. Pp. x, 562, plus CD audio 
appendix (narrated by Nat Hentoff). $29.95. 
In 1950, Felix Frankfurter famously observed that "[i)t is a fair 
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have 
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice 
people."1 The circumstances of Justice Frankfurter's observation were 
hardly atypical, for his opinion arose in a Fourth Amendment case 
involving a man plainly guilty of the crime with which he had been 
charged - fraudulently altering postage stamps in order to make rela­
tively ordinary ones especially valuable for collectors. Indeed, Fourth 
Amendment cases typically present the phenomenon that Frankfurter 
pithily identified, for most of the people injured by an unlawful search 
are those whose unlawfully searched premises contained actual 
evidence of the actual crime they actually committed. Other dimen­
sions of constitutional criminal procedure present the phenomenon in 
a more attenuated way, because liberties like the rights to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses and to be free of compelled self­
incrimination are ones in which it is more likely that the procedural 
defects will bear on the defendant's guilt. But it is still the case that 
almost all of the American constitutional law of criminal procedure 
has been built by those whose underlying guilt could not seriously be 
questioned. 
Just as the guilty have shaped our liberties in the realm of criminal 
procedure, a similar rhetoric identifies the distasteful individuals who 
have been at the center of the development of the First Amendment. 
Indeed, some of these individuals have been considerably more 
distasteful than the "shabby defrauder,"2 to use Justice Frankfurter's 
words, who was at the center of the Rabinowitz case. Clarence 
* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Gov­
ernment, Harvard University. - Ed. Research support was generously provided by the Joan 
Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy. 
1. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
2. Id. at 69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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Brandenburg was a local leader of the Ku Klux Klan.3 Jay Near's not 
totally inaccurate observations about the "Jewish gangsters" in 
Minneapolis stemmed from a much deeper-seated anti-Semitism.4 
Larry Flynt5 thinks it amusing and harmless to celebrate gang rape6 or 
to portray women as pieces of meat.7 The protagonists in the Skokie 
litigation8 comprised much of the membership of the American Nazi 
Party. The most recent important case involving public marches 
involved a group who appeared to believe that one could not be simul­
taneously gay and Irish.9 Indeed, even some of the less evil figures at 
the center of the First Amendment's history have hardly inspired 
genuine affection. Zechariah Chafee took pains to comment on the 
Jehovah's Witnesses "astonishing powers of annoyance";10 we suspect 
that Paul Cohen11 may have been inspired as much by a juvenile desire 
to annoy his elders as by deep antiwar conviction; most of commercial 
speech doctrine has developed through litigation launched by such 
luminaries as the Coors Brewing Company12 and the chain drugstores13 
that anchor so many of our strip malls; and numerous other prominent 
First Amendment litigants could best be described as "cranks."14 
3. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see also Forsyth County, 
Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
4. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). The full background of the 
case is documented in FRED w. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF 
THE LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASE THAT GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM OF 
THE PRESS (1981). 
5. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
6. HUSTLER, Jan. 1983, at Cover. 
7. HUSTLER, June 1978, at Cover. 
8. Nat'! Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam); Collin 
v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). The entire controversy is recounted in DONALD A. 
DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985); 
ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE 
RISKS OF FREEDOM (1979); Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy 
Case" and Free Speech Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617 (1982) (reviewing NEIER, supra); and 
David Goldberger, Skokie: The First Amendment Under Attack by Its Friends, 29 MERCER 
L. REV. 761 (1978). 
9. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
10. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 399 (1948). The 
contributions of the Jehovah's Witnesses to the development of First Amendment doctrine 
include Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 
(1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940). 
11. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
12. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
13. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
14. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); 
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Ter­
miniello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
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Despite the prominence of such a sorry array of First Amendment 
litigants, there is a parallel story in which there are genuine heroes 
of the First Amendment - reasonably good people saying important 
things, at considerable risk to themselves, whose claims were 
ultimately (even if not in their own cases) vindicated, and whose 
vindication advanced the cause of the First Amendment. Daniel 
Ellsberg would fit this characterization,1 5  as would the signers of the 
advertisement in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1 6 and perhaps also 
the New York Times itself. Much the same can, and should, also be 
said about the vast number of civil rights demonstrators, 17 Vietnam 
protesters,1 8 World War I protesters,1 9 labor agitators,20 harmless anar­
chists,21 and innocuous Communists,22 among others, who no less than 
the Brandenburgs, the Collins, the Flynts, and the Nears have been 
central figures in the development of the First Amendment. 
Because so much of the First Amendment literature has been 
produced by some of its most illustrious celebrants, it turns out that 
there is almost always a hero. Sometimes it is a speaker, sometimes it 
is a lawyer, and sometimes it is a judge, but the literature of the First 
Amendment, like the literature of epic battles, always has a hero. The 
First Amendment's most prominent good guys and bad guys have 
frequently been featured in books and articles,23 and that literature has 
15. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). For a com­
plete account, see DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF 
THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE (1996). 
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
17. Carey v. Brown. 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 
(1969); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne County, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); cf NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 
(1982) (organizing economic boycott of Black citizens against White merchants). 
18. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 
105 (1973) (per curiam); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam); Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 
367 (1968); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). 
19. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
20. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). 
21. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 
( 1919). 
22. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961 ); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 
(1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
23. See supra notes 4, 8, 15; see also CORYDON B. DUNHAM, FIGHTING FOR THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: STANTON OF CBS VS. CONGRESS AND THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE (1997); 
EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND 
THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS (1992); ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991). 
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been invaluable in helping us to understand the politics and the 
sociology of the First Amendment's development.24 
The latest addition to the tradition of books celebrating the First 
Amendment's heroes is Ronald Collins25 and David Skover's26 story of 
the 1950s and 1960s battles between the outrageous comedian Lenny 
Bruce and the last throes of vigorous American obscenity law. The 
book tells an important and engaging story in full and appropriate 
detail, but even more, it may tell us something about the role that 
individuals and their stories have played in the development of the law 
and the culture of the First Amendment. 
I. 
Lenny Bruce may not be particularly well-known to those genera­
tions that did not experience the 1950s or the 1960s, and if nothing else 
this book is an important account of an important figure. It would be 
hard to capture fully all that was Lenny Bruce, but this book goes a 
long way in that direction. Aided by an audio CD including many of 
his comedy routines, and accompanied by liberal and valuable lengthy 
quotations from letters and contemporary accounts, Collins and 
Skover present a Lenny Bruce who was, on the one hand, an extraor­
dinarily talented and genuinely funny and insightful comedian and 
social critic, but was, on the other hand, just as much a narcissistic and 
self-indulgent drug addict with little sense of himself or his limitations. 
Indeed, just as the book's material from Bruce's routines make his 
talent and incisiveness clear, so too do the book's detailed ·accounts of 
Bruce's numerous legal and personal battles make obvious the 
ultimately fatal flaws in his personality. His ability to irritate audiences 
was part of his talent and had much to do with his fame, but his ability 
to infuriate police, prosecutors, judges - even sympathetic ones -
and especially his own lawyers, whom he fired with some frequency in 
the wildly mistaken belief that things would go better were he in 
charge, is a large part of the Lenny Bruce story. 
The focus of this book, however, is not on the totality of Lenny 
Bruce, but on Bruce's engagements with the obscenity laws and with 
those who enforced them, and it is here that Collins and Skover see 
Bruce as a hero, precisely the word they use on multiple occasions to 
describe his relationship with the First Amendment (pp. 1, 7, 10, 359, 
404, 431, 449). For Collins and Skover, Lenny Bruce is someone who 
was persecuted because of the way in which his humor challenged 
conventional values and powerful people, who endured years of legal 
24. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Situating Schauer, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1519-22 
(1997). 
25. Resident Scholar, Freedom Forum First Amendment Center. 
26. Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. 
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battles for daring to take on the sacred cows of our society, and who 
became a "martyr" (pp. 8, 447) to the First Amendment because he 
refused to let himself be censored. As Collins and Skover tell their 
story, Bruce continued with his outrageous assault on popular sensi­
bilities even in the face of grave legal - and therefore personal -
risk.27 
Collins and Skover's book is simultaneously an easy and a hard 
read. Easy because the authors tell an important story with an impres­
sive attention to carefully researched detail and with a good balance 
between extensive quotations from primary materials and their own 
comprehensive account. Hard because they tell their story, engaging 
enough on its own terms, with a heavy-handed sense of outrage, a too 
simple view of the vices and virtues of the major players, and an 
extraordinarily liberal use of adjectives, adverbs, italics, exclamation 
points, and all of the other verbal devices that, on a printed page, 
substitute for pounding one's fist on the table or grabbing the reader 
by the lapels. Even more irritating, however, is the book's voice, 
which, in an attempt to get partly inside Bruce and his culture, refers 
to Bruce only as "Lenny," which far too often uses the "hip" language 
of the 50s and the 60s, and which comes across as more the behavior of 
the outcast trying to ingratiate himself with the "in-crowd" than as a 
successful attempt to tell a story as perceived by the primary players. 
The reader who is willing to put up with these stylistic quirks, 
however, will be rewarded with a fount of information about a 
genuinely important episode in modern cultural history and with an 
account of how the law - in this case the law of obscenity - often 
plays out not only in the Supreme Court of the United States, but also 
in the behavior and attitudes of police, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, 
and of course defendants. Even more important, the reader will come 
away from this book with the best picture we have so far of American 
obscenity law in transition, for the period of Bruce's legal difficulties 
was also the period of obscenity law's transformation. When we look 
carefully at the relationship between Bruce's legal troubles and this 
period of transition, however, we may see that Bruce was somewhat 
less of a hero than Collins and Skover make him out to be and is thus 
better characterized as someone who both used and was used by law 
in this transitional period. In truth, Bruce might have emerged as even 
more of a hero had he been somewhat more concerned about the First 
Amendment and somewhat less concerned about himself. 
27. A similar theme can be found in DE GRAZIA, supra note 23, at 444-79. 
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II. 
The law of obscenity, long an easy target for academic commenta­
tors,28 achieved much of its dismal reputation in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Although obscenity prosecutions in the United 
States date from the early part of the nineteenth century, and although 
such prosecutions were common in that century, most of those 
prosecutions were directed at "French postcards," at so-called police 
magazines that described crimes in lurid detail, and at various other 
publications largely at or beyond the margins of literary merit.29 It was 
not until the twentieth century that, for a complex array of political 
and cultural reasons, obscenity law focused on works now accepted as 
being literary masterpieces, or, even if not those, serious works of 
enduring literature. Although Ulysses was ultimately determined not 
to be legally obscene in New York in 1934,30 the very fact that this was 
considered a close case is ample evidence of the aggressiveness of 
American obscenity law. in the .first half of the twentieth century, an 
aggressiveness that also produced criminal convictions for the distribu­
tors of works such as Arthur Schnitzler's Casanova's Homecoming,31 
Radclyffe Hall's The Well of Loneliness,32 D.H. Lawrence's Lady 
Chatterley's Lover,33 Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of 
Capricorn,34 and Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy.35 Even as 
late as the early 1950s, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
found the "realistic detail" of the "sexual episodes" in Erskine 
Caldwell's God's Little Acre too much for it to bear, concluding that 
the book was legally obscene and subject to forfeiture.36 
28. See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem 
for Artistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499 (1996); David Cole, Playing by Pornography's 
Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1994); Louis Henkin, 
Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963); Harry 
Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. Cr. REV. 1; Peter Magrath, 
The Obscenity Cases: The Grapes of Roth, 1966 SUP. Cr. REV. 7; Henry P. Monaghan, 
Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quad, 76 YALE L.J. 
127 (1966); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of 
the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974); Amy Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and 
the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990). 
29. See FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 8-23 (1976). 
30. United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses" by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 
1934), aff'g 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). 
31. People v. Seltzer, 203 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1924). 
32. People v. Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 565 (Magis. Ct. 1929). 
33. People v. Dial Press, 48 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Magis. Ct. 1944). 
34. United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951), affd sub 
nom., Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953). 
35. Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N.E. 472 (Mass. 1930). 
36. Attorney Gen. v. Book Named "God's Little Acre," 93 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1950). 
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As social values changed, the aggressive use of obscenity law 
began to recede, however, and within not much more than twenty 
years, the conflicts between obscenity law and serious art and litera­
ture came almost to an end. Arguably assisted by the line of Supreme 
Court cases starting with Roth v. United States37 in 1957 and ending 
with Jenkins v. Georgia38 in 1974,39 American obscenity prosecution 
became almost entirely focused on works that, to put it charitably, 
were unlikely to find themselves in the literary canon. Although there 
are serious arguments over whether the state has any business 
restricting people from enjoying the pleasures of Sorority Girls 
Stringent Initiation and Dance with the Dominant Whip,40 the argument 
that such works deserve to engender the same literary or artistic 
esteem as An American Tragedy and God's Little Acre is hard to make 
with a straight face. 
The narrowing of American obscenity predated its constitutionali­
zation.41 Even in the pre-1957 years when obscenity remained a topic 
doctrinally untouched by First Amendment concerns, not only was 
Ulysses vindicated, but important state and federal decisions had 
concluded that a free society was not one in which James T. Farrell's 
37. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
38. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). 
39. Also relevant is Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977), making clear that the 
determination of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," Miller v. California,. 
413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973), was to be made on the basis of national and not local standards. 
Jenkins had earlier emphasized that even with regard to the "appeal to the prurient interest" 
and "patently offensive to contemporary community standards" prongs of the Miller test, as 
to which local and not national standards applied, the effect of regional variation was to be 
small when compared to the importance of First Amendment considerations, considerations 
that in Jenkins produced a unanimous Supreme Court ruling striking down a Georgia de­
termination that the motion picture Carnal Knowledge was legally obscene. After Jenkins 
had made clear that the effect of so-called local standards was to be small, and that the Su­
preme Court had meant what it said in describing the reach of obscenity law as limited to 
"hard core" materials, Miller, 413 U.S. at 36, prosecutions of anything even nearing serious 
art or literature became rare. Such prosecutions were not nonexistent, as is shown by the 
(unsuccessful) Cincinnati prosecution of an exhibition of Robert Mapplethorpe photographs 
Uury acquittal following the decisions in Contemporary Arts Center v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743 
(S.D. Ohio 1990), and City of Cincinnati v. Contemporary Arts Center, 566 N.E.2d 207, 214 
(Hamilton County Mun. Ct. 1990). See WENDY STEINER, THE SCANDAL OF PLEASURE: 
ART IN AN AGE OF FUNDAMENTALISM 9-59 (1995)) and the (ultimately unsuccessful) prose­
cution of the rap group Two Live Crew in Florida (Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.4d 
134 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)). But there is no indication that such plainly misguided 
prosecutions were any more common than misguided prosecutions of innocent people are 
under any other part of the criminal law. 
40. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). 
41. In this sense, the history of the narrowing of American obscenity law is consistent 
with the themes in GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991), for the social and legal movement that separated 
obscenity law from serious art and literature was one that substantially predated any of the 
Supreme Court decisions on the topic. 
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Studs Lanigan trilogy,42 William Faulkner's Sanctuary,43 and Kathleen 
Winsor's Forever Amber,44 for example, could be branded obscene and 
consequently unsellable. Indeed, even Roth was preceded by a series 
of Supreme Court cases in the late 1940s and early 1950s that had 
signaled the arrival of an era in which obscenity law, whatever its 
merits or demerits, could not be used against serious literature or 
political commentary.45 
III. 
Lenny Bruce thus found himself perched on the law in transition, 
and perched on it in two different ways. First, his comedy act focused 
on sexual language and sexual imagery at a time when, as just noted, 
the use of sexually explicit language alone (absent pictures or 
performances) was on the way out as the basis for an obscenity 
prosecution. Although it is still the case that material containing only 
text can be legally obscene,46 in practice the demise of obscenity 
prosecutions based entirely on words, whether printed or spoken and 
whether literary or not, started in the early 1950s and was largely 
complete by the late 1960s. In addition, the offensiveness (to some 
people) of Bruce's act also fell between two possible meanings of the 
word "obscene." The first, reflected in obscenity law, is the one under 
which "obscenity" refers to explicit and offensive portrayals of sex. 
But the second is that in an ordinary language sense, one occasionally 
reflected in the law of earlier generations, an "obscenity" is a dirty 
word, and one whose offensiveness need not relate to sex at all, and 
certainly not to sexual stimulation. When Justice Harlan in Cohen v. 
California41 observed that "Fuck the Draft" on the back of Paul 
Cohen's jacket was unlikely to create sexual stimulation in anyone,48 
he merely reflected the fact that an "obscenity," or even "obscene" 
42. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101, 104 (Phila. County Ct. Quarter Sess. 
1949), affd per curiam sub nom., Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 70 A.2d 389 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1949). 
43. Id. at 106. 
44. Attorney Gen. v. Book Named "Forever Amber," 81 N.E.2d 663 (Mass. 1948). 
45. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 
(1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); cf Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 
U.S. 848 (1948) (obscenity determination of Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County 
affirmed by an equally divided Court, with Justice Frankfurter, a friend of the author's, not 
participating), aff'g by an equally divided Court People v. Doubleday & Co., 77 N.E.2d 6 
(N.Y. 1947) (per curiam). 
46. Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973). 
47. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
48. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. John Hart Ely puts it better: "[A]nyone who finds Cohen's 
jacket 'obscene' or erotic had better have his valves checked." John Hart Ely, Flag 
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment 
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1493 (1975). 
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language, includes the full range of language on the FCC's list of 
prohibited words,49 and pretty close to the full range of language that 
people of my generation would not have used in the presence of their 
grandparents.50 Although Lenny Bruce was prosecuted in New York 
(pp. 189-313) and in California (pp. 37-137) for obscenity, it is plain 
that part of the impetus for his prosecution was more based on 
vulgarity than on obscenity, and was thus the same impetus that led to 
prosecutions of others for breach of the peace or other offenses 
involving the use of what in technical constitutional terminology is the 
language of "fighting words. "51 
In this respect, prosecuting Lenny Bruce for obscenity was signifi­
cantly a function of the unusual, at least in the doctrinal sense, setting 
for his act. Had he walked the streets calling people "motherfuckers," 
he would likely have been prosecuted, as was Cohen and as were his 
contemporaries and their forebears, for breach of the peace or some 
offense of that ilk.52 And had he used the same language in the privacy 
of his own home, or in the workplace or in the barracks, it is almost 
certain that he would have been prosecuted for nothing at all. Only 
because a live-comedy club hovered between the public and the 
private did those with a mind to deal with Bruce, and there were 
many, find themselves with no fully satisfactory legal avenue, and thus 
they settled on obscenity as, to them, the least inapt among a number 
of inapt alternatives.53 
IV. 
Because Lenny Bruce was being both scatalogically and sexually 
outrageous (and hilarious) at a time when the law was in transition in 
these two quite different ways, it is conceivable that he would not have 
49. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
50. People of today's generation find that their grandparents are people of my genera­
tion. 
51. E.g., Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972), vacating mem. 492 P.2d 1106, 1107 
(1972) (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) ("mother fucking fascist pig cops"); Lewis v. City of New 
Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (mem.) (Powell, J., concurring in the result) ("god damn 
mother fuckers"); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972), vacated and remanded 
mem. , 303 A.2d 889, 891 (N.J. 1973) ("motherfucking"); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 
520 n.1 (1972) ("son of a bitch"). 
52. On the First Amendment dimensions of criminal prosecutions for the use of "dirty" 
words, see, in addition to Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam); 
Cohen, Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) (per curiam); Kristen C. Nelson, Note, 
"Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 B.U. L. REV. 834 (1973); and Ellen K. 
Thomas, Note, Purging Unseemly Expletives from the Public Scene: A Constitutional Di­
lemma, 47 IND. L.J. 142 (1971). 
53. On the relationship between obscenity and obscene language in two of the three 
states (Illinois was the third) in which Bruce was prosecuted, see People v. Price, 84 Cal. 
Rptr. 585 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), and People v. Casey, 67 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Utica City Ct. 
1946). 
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been prosecuted at all. In the same year that Bruce was convicted on 
obscenity charges in New York (p. 294), the New York Court of 
Appeals had found Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (Fanny Hill) not 
obscene,54 and a county court in New York had a year earlier 
dismissed an obscenity prosecution based on Tropic of Cancer.55 Bruce 
was prosecuted on obscenity charges in Los Angeles in 1962 (pp. 79-
137), but at roughly the same time the California Supreme Court was 
also finding Tropic of Cancer not obscene,56 and only a few years later 
the California courts concluded that the California lewd-conduct 
statute was not even applicable to theaters.57 And several years before 
Bruce encountered the obscenity laws in· Chicago (pp. 139-88), the 
Seventh Circuit had invalidated as an unconstitutional prior restraint 
the Chicago film-licensing statute.58 More broadly, numerous 
American state and federal courts, in New York, in California, in 
Illinois, and elsewhere, had since the late 1940s been dismissing 
obscenity prosecutions and striking down censorship statutes in the 
name of the First Amendment.59 
As noted above, there were, of course, during roughly the same 
period also numerous obscenity convictions, although at the time of 
Bruce's legal difficulties the obscenity convictions in New York, at 
least, appear to have been largely restricted to far less mainstream 
material.60 Still, the overwhelming direction of the law throughout the 
country, added to the fact that multiple prosecutions produced no final 
convictions for Bruce himself,61 reinforces the conclusion that the law 
54. People v. Bookcase, Inc., 201 N.E.2d 14 (N .. Y. 1964). 
55. People v. Fritch, 236 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Onandaga County Ct. 1963), rev'd, 192 N.E.2d 
713 (N.Y. 1963). 
56. Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 383 P.2d 152 (Cal. 1963). 
57. Barrows v. Mun. Court, 464 P.2d 483 (Cal. 1970). And see the parallel proceedings 
in Barrows v. Reddin, 301 F. Supp. 574 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (per curiam). 
58. Zenith Int'l Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 291 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961). 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding work not ob­
scene on its face); Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960) (Lady 
Chatterley's Lover not obscene); New Am. Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. 
Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1953) (injunction against censorship); Attorney Gen. v. The Book 
Named "Tropic of Cancer," 184 N.E.2d 328 (Mass. 1962) ( Tropic of Cancer not obscene); 
People v. Douglas, 202 N.Y.S. 160, 168 (St. Lawrence County Ct. 1959) (dismissing obscenity 
charge with judicial observation that "You Cannot Legislate Morals!"); People ex rel. Kahan 
v. Creative Age Press, Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Magis. Ct. 1948) (dismissing obscenity prosecu­
tion); People v. Vanguard Press, 84 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Magis. Ct. 1947) (End As a Man, by 
Calder Willingham, not obscene); People v. London, 63 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Magis. Ct. 1946) 
(holding that works of literary merit cannot be barred in the name of protection against 
obscenity). 
60. See, e.g., People v. Cohen, 205 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Queens County Ct. 1960); People v. 
Bunis, 198 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Buffalo City Ct. 1960). 
61. This is technically untrue. The last of his convictions remained unappealed at the 
time of Bruce's death in 1966 because of the incompetence of Bruce as pro se counsel. 
Pp. 325-31. But because Bruce's co-defendant Howard Solomon prevailed on appeal, pp. 
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was proceeding along a moderately clear line toward deregulation 
even without Lenny Bruce's intervention. In that respect, it is not 
entirely clear why we would want to think of Bruce as a hero to the 
First Amendment. As any good negotiator knows, when you have 
gotten what you want you should change the subject. Bruce did not 
understand this basic lesson, and thus under circumstances in which he 
might well have remained legally invisible - even with the same act 
- he felt it necessary to draw attention to himself. And under circum­
stances in which the law might have been persuaded to leave him 
alone, Bruce did his best to provoke the law into action. Anyone so 
insensitive as not to realize the effect on then Second Circuit Judge 
Thurgood Marshall of using the word "nigger" as part of an oral 
argument (p. 304) was unlikely to have seen the steps, none inconsis­
tent with his pursuing his art in an uncensored way, that might have 
left him less vulnerable to the clutches of the law. 
Now it is possible, indeed probable on Collins and Skover's 
account, that Bruce's baiting of the law and of authority was not 
unrelated to his contemporaneous and subsequent fame. Dying62 and 
being censored63 are both good career moves, and if Bruce had been 
ignored instead of prosecuted it is quite possible that his humor would 
have had less of a sting and his name less of a place in history.64 
Throughout the book, Collins and Skover make clear that Bruce 
recognized this, and thus he had a complex relationship with his 
oppressors. Once Bruce was prosecuted, it became clear that he 
wanted to be vindicated, but it was equally clear that on repeated 
occasions he recognized the advantages of having been prosecuted in 
the first place. It is a vast understatement to note that Bruce did little 
to minimize the prospects of attracting police and prosecutorial atten­
tion. In addition to going out of his way to attract legal notice, Bruce 
also did his best to bungle his legal defenses. He fired a large number 
342-49, it is a fair conclusion, shared by many of Bruce's lawyers over the years, that this was 
the constructive equivalent of an appellate victory for Bruce himself. Pp. 346-49. At the time 
of this writing, Collins and Skover, with the media lawyer Richard Corn-Revere, are at the 
forefront of an effort to secure a posthumous formal pardon for Bruce from Governor 
George Pataki of New York. See Clyde Haberman, Absolution for a Martyr to the Profane?, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at Bl. 
62. P. 353 (quoting Artie Shaw as saying that "(djeath is the best publicity agent"). 
63. Would the photographer Robert Mapplethorpe, the artist Andres Serrano, the jour­
nalist Myron Farber (see Ronald Dworkin, The Rights of Myron Farber, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
Oct. 26, 1978, at 34), or the author Henry Miller be what they are remembered as today 
without having been the targets of what turned into free speech and free press controver­
sies? 
64. As quoted by Collins and Skover, Harry Kalven, Jr., who in addition to being a great 
scholar of the First Amendment was one of Bruce's lawyers in Chicago, said that "(i]n order 
to give value to his gestures of defiance, (Lenny] did need a lot of opposition . . . .  If you are 
going to break a taboo, it has to be a taboo." P.l (alteration in original). 
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of very good lawyers,65 interfered with the ones he did not (or had not 
yet) fired (pp. 61-62, 73, 168-69, 287), and often wound up ineptly 
representing himself (pp. 157-59, 301-11). As Collins and Skover 
document in great detail, Lenny Bruce pro se had both a fool for a 
client and a fool for a lawyer. 
All of this suggests that Collins and Skover's portrayal of Bruce as 
a largely innocent victim of the law is far from self-evident. He died 
from a drug overdose (pp. 336-42) at the age of forty, but he was a 
heroin addict before his legal difficulties started, and forty is probably 
not too far from the average life expectancy of even noncensored 
heroin addicts who have been addicted for well over a decade. He 
spent a great deal of money on his legal defenses, but he most likely 
squandered much more on drugs, and long before he was first 
prosecuted he was the kind of person who spent more on the 
payments and insurance on his Cadillac than he did on food and 
housing combined (p. 86). Several of his trials and hearings produced 
first-instance judgments against him, but in light of the fact that Bruce 
won on a number of occasions and others were winning obscenity 
cases at the same time, it is hard to say whether the results would not 
have been different with more competent lawyering from good 
lawyers unrestrained by their client's ego. 
Moreover, although Bruce was prosecuted under the obscenity 
laws, it is again at least an open question whether his crimes were not 
more political (or religious) than sexual. Even under the· controversial 
assumption that there is a sharp demarcation between the two,66 
Bruce's offense may well have been mostly that of taking aim at 
various icons - Eleanor Roosevelt (p. 387), the Catholic Church (pp. 
145-46), African Americans (pp. 146, 304), Hiroshima (p. 145), and 
many others. We do not know for sure whether those he most irritated 
would have come up with some other method of prosecuting him had 
the obscenity laws been unavailable, but it is hardly inconceivable that 
such would have been the case. 
It is thus far more murky than Collins and Skover make out that 
Bruce was a hero of the First Amendment. Even they acknowledge 
that his multiple legal controversies "had virtually no formal impact 
on the state or national law of obscenity," (p. 349) and they recognize 
as well that the law was already on Bruce's side by the time he was 
alleged to have broken it (p. 404). Moreover, the trends in the law of 
the time leave open the substantial possibility that different defendant 
behavior even with the same act would have produced few if any 
65. Examples abound throughout the book, but the best flavor comes from the 
statements of Maurice Rosenfield, pp. 328-29, and from the bitter end of his relationship 
with the distinguished civil liberties lawyer Ephraim London, pp. 288-89. 
66. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON 
LIFE AND LAW (1987). 
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prosecutions and a much larger percentage of legal victories, and 
at lower cost. Indeed, it is even possible that different defendant 
behavior would have produced earlier and clearer legal victories for 
Bruce, and thus it is possible that Bruce impeded rather than fostered 
the further emergence of a world in which Bruce's language, imagery, 
social satire, and political commentary would remain, except in rare 
cases, well outside the purview of the law. 
In important respects, therefore, Collins and Skover present data 
and a history inconsistent with the lesson that they draw from them. It 
would have been better for society, even if not for Bruce, had he not 
been prosecuted at all, and it would have been better for both Bruce 
and for society if his prosecutions had produced earlier and clearer 
defense victories. But much of the blame for this failure must lie at 
Bruce's own feet, and the same can be said about Bruce's death and 
the personal and financial failings that preceded it. And although 
Lenny Bruce joins the list of those whose prosecution would have 
been less likely were the law different, there is little indication that 
Bruce did much, doctrinally or politically, to hasten such a state of 
affairs. Bruce was a victim of an unfortunate state of the law, but there 
is a difference between a victim and a hero, and what emerges from 
Collins and Skover's account is a Bruce who was at best a victim, and 
who by their own account, even if not by their own conclusions from 
that account, was hardly a hero. 
v. 
The characterization of Bruce as a hero, however, whether 
accurate or not, at least invites us to speculate on the relationship of 
the First Amendment's heroic figures to the development of First 
Amendment doctrine. Although it is undoubtedly correct that a 
motley crew of undesirables has achieved First Amendment promi­
nence, the standard account that First Amendment doctrine has been 
built on the foundations of the likes of Collin, Brandenburg, Near, and 
Flynt appears to be a misleading oversimplification. If we examine the 
cases in which the First Amendment has been taken in a genuinely 
new direction, or been brought into a new arena, the chief protagonist 
has rarely been as unappealing as those on the foregoing list. More 
often, the litigants at the forefront of genuine First Amendment 
breakthroughs have either been individually sympathetic or at least 
have been parties that the courts - and some of the public - are 
likely to perceive as having been unduly or unfairly persecuted. Not 
only was libel brought into the First Amendment on the shoulders of 
the very sympathetic litigants in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,67 but 
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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the same phenomenon exists in other areas of First Amendment 
expansion. The early commercial speech cases did not involve tobacco 
and liquor advertisers seeking to employ the best of Madison Avenue 
techniques in order to increase the market for their products, but 
generally involved upstarts frozen out by entrenched professional 
oligopolies such as the "independent" pharmacists in Virginia 
Pharmacy and the established lawyers and law firms in Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona.68 The litigants in the breakthrough fighting-words 
cases were people whose primary crime was backtalk to bullying 
police officers,69 and the significant breakthroughs even in obscenity 
law came largely as a consequence of serious publishers attempting to 
promote serious works of literature.70 
Conversely, most of the genuinely bad people at the center of the 
First Amendment's history have been people who did not so much 
create new doctrine as they enjoyed or crystallized the benefits of 
earlier doctrinal breakthroughs. Brandenburg merely put the capstone 
on an edifice constructed by Yates,71 Scales,72 Noto,73 and the changing 
values of the post-McCarthy era.74 Larry Flynt won his case75 easily 
because of the precedent of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.76 Jay 
Near's victory77 was ensured less by his own case than by a centrality 
that the aversion to prior restraint possessed dating to Blackstone78 
and which was never doubted even in the early years of the First 
Amendment.79 And Frank Collin and his band of neo-Nazis prevailed80 
without even the necessity of a Supreme Court opinion, for by 1977 
and 1978 the Brandenburg and Cohen precedents were sufficient to 
make "Skokie" an easy case. More recently, when First Amendment 
68. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
69. See supra note 51. 
70. See, e.g., supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
71. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
72. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
73. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). 
74. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975); see also Hans A. Linde, 
"Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 
STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Frank R. Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": 
From Schenck to Brandenburg and Beyond, 1969 SUP. Cr. REV. 41. 
75. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
76. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
77. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
78. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *151-52. 
79. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (Holmes, J.); LEONARD w. LEVY, 
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985). 
80. See supra note 8. 
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breakthroughs have been urged . by telemarketers,81 computer 
"spammers,"82 workplace gropers,83 and even music pirates,84 for 
example, the results have generally been negative. A totally Legal 
Realist account of the development of First Amendment doctrine is 
undoubtedly excessively reductionist,85 but it would be equally reduc­
tionist to ignore the extent to which sympathetic litigants far more 
than the standard list of heroic villains have been the major figures in 
the actual expansion and strengthening of First Amendment doctrine. 
Had Lenny Bruce been more sympathetic he might have done more 
for the First Amendment, but given Bruce's personality, the best we 
can say about him is that he was a victim of an earlier age who at least 
did the First Amendment little harm. 
VI. 
Although I disagree with the conclusions that Collins and Skover 
reach, and although I wish they had written a less stylistically irritating 
book, there should be no underestimating the importance of the data 
that they have impressively amassed. The heroic tradition of the First 
Amendment reflects an insight, largely correct, that particular 
individuals with particular things to say in a particular way have 
played an important role in the development of free speech doctrine, 
likely larger than the role that particular individuals have played in the 
development of constitutional doctrine in many other areas. In 
addition, the effect of First Amendment doctrine once crystallized, as 
the cases of Brandenburg, Collin, Flynt, Near, and many others 
demonstrate, is to abstract away from individuals and their context, 
81. See U.S. West, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1213 (2000); Moser v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 46 F.3d 
970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Int'! Funding Inst. Inc., 969 F.2d 1110, 
1118 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en bane); Michael Shannon, Note, Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls: 
The "Do Not Call" Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS. 381 (2001). 
82. See ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Compuserve Inc. v. 
Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Michael A. Fisher, The Right to 
Spam?: Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 363 (2000). 
83. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), discussed in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 
1994 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, and Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (Catharine MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 
forthcoming 2003). 
84. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affd sub nom., Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). 
85. As is demonstrated persuasively in Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, 
Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 
(2002). 
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for this abstraction86 is a key feature in explaining just why it is that 
bad people with harmful things to say have so often been First 
Amendment victors. If there is a hero in this book, it is less likely to 
have been Lenny Bruce himself than people like San Francisco 
Municipal Court Judge Clayton Horn (pp. 61-78), for it was Judge 
Horn who in the face of appalling courtroom conduct by the 
defendant nevertheless gave the jury instructions that facilitated 
Bruce's acquittal. In the face of such genuinely heroic behavior, it says 
much about the history and entrenchment of the First Amendment 
that even the nonheroic antics of Lenny Bruce were ultimately 
unavailing, and that the development of the modern First 
Amendment, rather than being assisted by Lenny Bruce, was, ironi­
cally, able to resist him. 
86. See Frederick Schauer, Justice Stevens and the Size of Constitutional Decisions, 27 
RUTGERS L.J. 543 (1996); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First 
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 84-85 (1998). 
